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Abstract
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive ra-
dio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode
and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network,
a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission
with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and
the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower
sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem
with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in
the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching
scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show
that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission
modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher
throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the development in Cognitive Radio (CR) technologies, recently Dynamic Spectrum
Access (DSA) has seen tremendous advancements in improving the efficiency of Radio Fre-
quency (RF) spectrum management [1]. With the emphasis on policy and spectrum agility, DSA
is also envisaged to provide more flexible business models for spectrum sharing with the non-
legitimated (secondary) spectrum users. Meanwhile, with the proliferation of low-power networks
such as Internet of Things (IoT), green powered CR networks with the capabilities of energy
harvesting have also drawn the focus of research in addition to the studies on RF efficiency [1].
By enabling RF energy harvesting on the CR devices, the green powered CR network is able
to opportunistically harness the free energy from primary signals as well as exploiting the
underutilized spectrum. However, in a typical RF-powered CR network, the transmission is
1usually organized in a harvest-then-transmit manner [2], [3]. As a result, the performance of the
secondary transmission is mainly dependent on the activity of the Primary Transmitters (PTs).
In particular, to guarantee a satisfying performance of the RF-powered Secondary Transmitters
(STs), the activity of the PTs is expected to be kept at a mild level. Otherwise, a PT with high
frequent data transmission will leave the STs little time for transmitting over the idle channel,
while a PT with low frequent data transmission will result in shortage of the harvested energy.
In both situations, the total transmitted bits by the STs may be significantly reduced.
To overcome the performance degradation due to the uncontrollable PT activities, ambient
backscattering [4] has recently been introduced into the RF-powered CR networks [5]. With
ambient backscattering, an ST uses modulated backscattering of the ambient signals (i.e., the
primary signals), such as UHF TV or Wi-Fi signals, to communicate with the Secondary Receiver
(SR). A backscattering ST can transmit passively by switching between reflecting and non-
reflecting states at a much lower rate than that of the ambient signals. The target SR decodes
the information from the received signal using a simple averaging mechanism [4]. However,
although the circuit power consumption of backscattering is negligible, to maintain the power
level of the backscattered signal, it is impractical for an ST to harvest the RF energy while
operating in the backscattering mode. Therefore, when integrating the ambient backscattering
module into the existing RF-powered CR devices, a natural question arises on how to properly
allocate the time resource between the two modes of backscattering and harvesting, such that
the total transmitted bits of the STs are maximized.
In this paper, we consider a multi-user CR network, where the STs are able to transmit data
by using the overlaid, harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode in a hybrid
scheme. To answer the above question on optimal resource allocation, we formulate the joint
transmit-mode selection and time resource allocation problem as a constrained non-cooperative
game among the STs. In addition, to cope with the interference caused by STs due to imperfect
channel sensing, we introduce a pricing mechanism for the primary network to control the
STs’ transmit behaviors indirectly with monetary incentives. Furthermore, the resource allocation
based on dynamic interference pricing is formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Based
on the analysis of the game properties, we propose a distributed, iterative allocation strategy
searching mechanism which is guaranteed to converge to the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE).
A. Related Work
21) Resource Allocation in RF-Powered CR Networks: In the past few years, a great amount
of effort has been put in the study of the techniques for RF-powered CR networks (see [6]
and the references therein). In an RF-powered CR network, energy harvesting and spectrum
access are performed opportunistically following a “sensing-harvesting-transmission” paradigm.
In particular, in the scenario where the PT randomly occupies and evacuates the channel, an ST
is subject to the constraints on the interference probability with the PTs as well as the constraint
on the total consumable energy for transmission. Therefore, for an ST, a balance is expected to
be stroke between the time allocated for sensing and the time allocated for energy harvesting.
In [7], [8], the problems of optimal pairing for the sensing duration and detection threshold in an
RF-powered network are addressed through the formulation of constrained (stochastic) nonlinear
programming problems. In [9], the study is further extended to the scenario of cooperative sensing
with data/decision, where a single ST uses the imperfect detection results from multiple mini-
sensing slots to determine its operation mode. Furthermore, by extending the degree of freedom
in the decision or resource variable space, the trade-off problems between sensing, harvesting
and throughput have also been incorporated into the scenarios of Time-Division Multiplexing
Access (TDMA) in multi-user CR networks [10], multi-channel selection [11] and cognitive
relay networks [12].
2) Ambient Backscatter and its Application in CR Networks: Compared with the traditional
backscatter devices which rely on a dedicated carrier emitter, ambient backscattering devices
leverages the uncontrollable, pre-existing (i.e., ambient) RF signals for its own transmission [4].
Since the introduction of ambient backscattering technique [4], considerable effort has been
devoted to improving its performance in terms of transmit range, throughput and Bit Error Rate
(BER) [13]–[15]. In [13], the backscatter devices use a Wi-Fi Access Point (AP) as the ambient
RF source as well as the receiver. Since the AP works as both the RF source and the receiver,
and therefore knows the original signal, it is possible for the backscattering transmitter to adopt
phase modulation and for the AP to implement self-interference cancellation based on standard
channel estimation in the system. With the improved backscatter coding/decoding mechanism,
the proposed mechanism in [13] achieves a throughput of 1Mbps at the transmit range of 5m.
Alternatively, when unknown ambient signals are used for backscattering, differential encoding
and on-off keying is usually adopted at the transmitter [14]. Correspondingly, energy detection
based on hypothesis test is usually used by the receiver/reader for decoding without the need of
knowing the channel state information. In [15], by allowing the transmitter’s antenna to change
3its impedance and backscatter with 3 states, the constellation density is expanded to a ternary
code from on-off keying. Thereby, a significant increase in the transmit bitrate can be achieved
with the same energy detection-based decoding mechanism at the receiver.
With the convenience of requiring no dedicated infrastructure to generate carrier signals
and utilizing existing ambient signals for transmission, ambient backscattering is considered
especially appropriate to be incorporated into RF-powered CR networks. In addition, the func-
tionalities required by ambient backscatter such as carrier sensing and distributed Multiple Access
Control (MAC) protocol [4] are ready-to-access in CR networks [1]. Meanwhile, since backscatter
only creates additional paths from the backscattering transmitter to the primary receiver of the
ambient signals, it can be effectively removed by the existing techniques such as multi-path
distortion equalizer at the primary receiver or precoding at the PT. Also, a backscatter transmitter
can offset the carrier phase by a certain frequency to avoid the interference [16]. Therefore,
backscatter-induced interference to the primary transmission is generally negligible [4]. Recently,
emerging applications of ambient backscatter in RF-powered CR networks have been proposed
in [5], [17], [18]. In these works, the research focus is mostly placed on optimal operation
scheduling for a single ST [5], [17], or centralized scheduling for multiple STs [18].
B. Contributions and Paper Organization
In this paper, we study a CR network with multiple, hybrid STs that are jointly powered by RF-
energy harvesting and backscattering techniques. Compared with the existing studies, we consider
the practical situation for the CR network to have imperfect channel sensing capabilities, and
emphasize the distributed nature of the CR network. To compensate the potential interference
caused by RF-powered ST transmission, we introduce a pricing mechanism for the primary
network to guide the time resource allocation among the STs. We model the interaction between
the primary network and the secondary network as a single-leader-multi-follower hierarchical
game. By providing a series of theoretical analyses on the properties of the equilibria in the
game, we propose an iterative, distributed strategy searching mechanism that guarantees the
convergence to the Stackelberg Equilibria (SE) as well as the social optimality among the STs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes TDMA-based sensing and
transmission mechanism with joint energy-harvesting and ambient backscattering. Section III
introduces the pricing mechanism for interference compensation and proposes the Stackelberg
game-based formulation of the interaction between the primary and secondary networks. Sec-
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Fig. 1. System model. (a) Network structure. (b) An example of sub-time slot allocation in the two channel states.
tion IV proposes the distributed equilibrium searching method based on the game analysis
presented in Section III. Section V provides the numerical simulations for performance evaluation
of the proposed algorithm and Section VI concludes the paper with a summary of the contribution.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-transmitter CR network where K STs are equipped with both an energy
harvesting module and a backscatter circuit (see Figure 1(a)). We assume that the PT’s channel
occupancy process can be modeled as a discrete-time 0-1 renewal process, where “0” represents
the state Idle and “1” represents the state Busy. The minimum waiting time between two
successive state renewal is T , which is also the time length of the STs’ time slot. We assume that
during one time slot the probabilities for the channel to be at the two states, i.e., Idle and Busy
are known a-priori as p0 and p1 = 1 − p0, respectively. For the discrete-time renewal process,
they are also the steady-state probabilities. The STs operate in TDMA mode and transmit to the
same Secondary Gateway (SG). An ST switches between the harvest-then-transmit mode and
the backscattering mode for its own data transmission. When operating as an active transmitter,
the ST is expected to transmit in an overlaying mode. When the channel is occupied by the
primary transmission, the ST cannot transmit but is able to either harvest energy from the PT’s
signal or backscatter the PT’s signal for its own data transmission with a relatively lower bitrate.
We consider that the SG deploys an energy detector and is responsible for notifying the STs
about the state of the primary channel. We assume that the secondary transmission is executed
in time slots, and each time slot can be further divided into three sub-phases for channel sensing,
energy-harvesting/backscattering and active transmission, respectively (see Figure 1(b)).
A. Spectrum Sensing
Since both the harvest-then-transmit mode and the backscattering mode are of low energy,
we assume that the STs are placed not too far from the SG. Therefore, the PT activities can be
5considered identical across the CR network. We consider that the SG is able to dynamically
set up the length of the sensing phase and the detection threshold. Based on the standard
detection theoretic formulation [19], [20], for the received primary signal y(t) at the SG, a
binary hypothesis testing can be formulated as follows:
y(t) =

 w(t) : H0,√hPTx(t) + w(t) : H1, (1)
where w(t) is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with the variance ξ2, and
√
hPTx(t)
is the received primary signal with the average power gain hPT. H0 denotes the hypothesis that
the primary channel is in state Idle, and H1 denotes the hypothesis that the primary signal is
in state Busy. The performance of energy detection is measured using the sample statistics Y =∑N
i=1 y
2(i) in terms of the probabilities of false alarm pf = Pr(Y > ǫ|H0) and detection pd =
Pr(Y > ǫ|H1) with the detection threshold ǫ. Under the standard assumptions in the literature of
channel sensing techniques in cognitive radio networks [19], [20], Y can be approximated as a
Gaussian random variable, the mean and variance of which under H0 and H1 are E(Y |H0) = ξ2,
E(Y |H1) = (γ+1)ξ2, V ar(Y |H0) = 2N ξ4 and V ar(Y |H1) = 2N (γ+1)ξ4, respectively. Here, γ
is the received Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) from the PT at the SG, and we have γ = hPTPPT/ξ
2
with the primary transmit power PPT. Given the channel bandwidth W , sensing time τ
s and
detection threshold ǫ, we have N = Wτ s and according to [19], [20],

pf(τ s, ǫ) = Q
(
ǫ− ξ2√
2ξ2
√
Wτ s
)
,
pd(τ s, ǫ) = Q
(
ǫ− (1 + γ)ξ2√
2(1 + γ)ξ2
√
Wτ s
)
,
(2)
where Q(x) = (1/
√
2π)
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt is known as the Q-function.
B. Transmission Based on Energy Harvesting and Backscattering
The STs select their operation mode according to the channel detection result provided by the
SG. When the channel is detected to be busy, an ST chooses to either harvest energy from the
PT signals or backscatter for its own transmission. Otherwise, the ST can choose to transmit
data using the energy harvested during the energy-harvesting phase. To address the conflict over
channel usage among the STs, the TDMA mechanism is adopted by the CR network in its MAC
layer, and the SG is responsible for synchronizing the phases of sensing, harvesting/backscattering
and transmission among the STs. Since the performance of the STs depends on the accuracy of
the channel sensing result, we also need to explicitly consider the impact of the sensing error
6on the ST operation in the three phases. Let τhk denote the time length that is allocated to ST k
for energy harvesting when the channel is detected as busy. Then, the expected RF energy that
is harvested from the PT by ST k during the energy-harvesting phase τhk is
EHk (τ
s, ǫ, τhk ) = p1p
d(τ s, ǫ)τhk δh
PT
k PPT, (3)
where p1 is the probability for the channel to be busy (i.e., hypothesis H1), δ is the energy
harvesting efficiency ratio (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) and hPTk is the channel power gain from the PT to ST k.
Note that in (3) we omit the case of hypothesis H0, since no energy can be sufficiently harvested
when a false alarm happens and the channel is actually idle.
Let τ bk denote the length of time allocated to ST k for backscattering. Since the backscattering
bitrate is determined by the built-in backscatter circuit [4], we consider that the backscattering
bitrate of ST k is fixed as rbk during the backscattering phase τ
b
k . Note that when a false alarm
happens, ST k cannot effectively backscatter due to the absence of the primary signals. Therefore,
we can express the expected backscattering rate for ST k during τ bk as follows:
rbk(τ
s, ǫ) = p1p
d(τ s, ǫ)rbk. (4)
Alternatively, when the channel is detected as idle and ST k decides to perform active
data transmission, its transmission rate in the opportunistic transmission phase depends on the
available energy that is harvested during the energy harvesting phase. Since the circuit power
consumption is not negligible for active transmission, we consider that each ST has to provide
a fixed power P c for powering the circuit [5], [21]. Let τ tk denote the length of time allocated
to ST k for active data transmission. Consider that the STs adopt an opportunistic transmission
policy by sustaining the active transmission during T with the expected level of harvested energy
during the same length of period. From (3), the expected power that ST k achieves during τ tk is
Pk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k) =
EHk (τ
s, ǫ, τhk )− P cτ tk
τ tk
=
p1p
d(τ s, ǫ)τhk δh
PT
k PPT
τ tk
− P c, (5)
which is naturally accompanied by the supply-power constraint Pk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k) ≥ 0.
Let σ2k denote the AWGN power over the link from ST k to the SG, and hk denote the
corresponding channel power gain. Then, by taking into consideration the impact of false alarm
and miss detection of the PT signals, the expected active transmission rate during τ tk is
rtk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k)= p0(1−pf(τ s, ǫ))κkW log2
(
1−P c+hkPk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k)
σ2k
)
+p1(1−pd(τ s, ǫ))κkW log2
(
1−P c+hkPk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k)
hPTPPT+σ2k
)
,
(6)
7where p0 is the probability for the channel to be idle, p1 is the probability for the channel to
be busy, κk is the transmission efficiency ratio (0 ≤ κk ≤ 1), hPT is the channel power gain
from the PT to the SG, hk is the power gain for the secondary link k and Pk(τ
s, ǫ, τhk , τ
t
k) is the
expected transmit power given in (5). On the right-hand-side of (6), the first term represents the
bitrate achieved by ST k when the channel is correctly detected as idle, and the second term
represents the bitrate achieved by ST k when miss detection happens.
Let T denote the total length of one time slot for the secondary network. After the length of
the sensing phase τ s is determined by the SG, the STs jointly determine the allocation of the sub-
time slots, τhk , τ
b
k and τ
t
k, within the accessible time range [0, T−τ s] in the corresponding channel
state. Following the TDMA mechanism, in either the transmitting mode or the backscattering
mode, only one ST is allowed to operate over the channel at any time instance. Then, the sub-time
slot allocation for ST k (1≤k≤K) has to satisfy the feasibility constraints∑Kk=1 τ tk ≤ (T −τ s),∑K
k=1 τ
b
k ≤ (T − τ s) and τhk + τ bk ≤ (T − τ s). Let sk = (τhk , τ tk, τ bk) denote ST k’s individual
choice for sub-time slot allocation. Then, given a pair of the sensing parameters (τ s, ǫ) set by
the SG, the transmission time scheduling problem for ST k (1≤ k≤K) can be formulated as
follows:
ST k’s utility optimization problem is to find a strategy vector s∗k = (τ
h,∗
k , τ
t,∗
k , τ
b,∗
k ) such that
s∗k = argmax
sk
(
uk(sk; τ
s, ǫ) = τ bkr
b
k(τ
s, ǫ) + τ tkr
t
k(τ
h
k , τ
t
k; τ
s, ǫ)
)
, (7)
s.t.
K∑
i=1
τ bi ≤ (T − τ s),
K∑
i=1
τ ti ≤ (T − τ s), (7a)
τ bk + τ
h
k ≤ (T − τ s), τhk ≥ 0, τ tk ≥ 0, τ bk ≥ 0, (7b)
p1p
d(τ s, ǫ)δhPTk PPTτ
h
k − P cτ tk ≥ 0, (7c)
where rbk(τ
s, ǫ) and rtk(τ
h
k , τ
t
k; τ
s, ǫ) are given in (4) and (6), respectively. (7a) defines a set of
common constraints that are shared by all the STs. It is worth noting that the two inequalities
in (7a), namely,
∑K
i=1 τ
b
i ≤ (T − τ s) and
∑K
i=1 τ
t
i ≤ (T − τ s), represent the constraints at state
Busy and state Idle, respectively. Let sST = [s1, . . . , sK ]
⊤ denote the joint strategy vector for
time resource allocation, and sST−k denote the joint strategies chosen by the adversaries of ST k.
Then, from (7a), we note that the local strategy searching space of ST k is determined by the
adversaries’ strategy sST−k. (7b) provides the feasibility constraints. (7c) is the linear supply-power
constraint derived based on the discussion about (5).
8III. STACKELBERG GAME FOR TIME RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Based on the system model given in Section II, now we are ready to introduce an interference
pricing mechanism for the SG to control the time resource allocation process among the STs.
In this section, we will first provide the Stackelberg game-based mathematical model of the
interaction between the SG and the STs. Then, with the backward induction-based analysis, we
will present a series of discoveries regarding the properties of the game.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
From the perspective of the PT, a low interference level, hence a low miss detection probability
1−pd(τ s, ǫ) is expected for the secondary network. By (2), the PT naturally prefers a long sensing
phase and a small detection threshold. In contrast, given the constraint on the harvested energy,
the STs prefer to extend their transmit phase as long as possible. Since with imperfect channel
detection, the interference from the STs cannot be completely eliminated, we consider that the
PT is able to tolerate a certain level of interference, provided that the STs pay compensation, i.e.,
price, for the interference that they cause in the harvest-then-transmit mode. Thereby, we consider
that the SG works on behalf of the primary network and is able to collect the payments from
the STs for the interference that they cause to the PT. For each ST, the interference is measured
in the time fraction of colliding with the PT. To properly encourage or curb the primary channel
usage by the STs, the gateway is allowed to adaptively choose the sensing time τ s, detection
testing threshold ǫ and uniform interference price. Let α denote the unit price of the interference
time, then, the SG’s expected revenue optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
The SG’s revenue optimization problem is to find a strategy vector s∗0=(α
∗, τ s,∗, ǫ∗) such that
s∗0 = arg max
s0=(α,τs,ǫ)
(
θ0(s0; s
ST) = αp1
K∑
k=1
(1− pd(τ s, ǫ))τ tk.
)
(8)
s.t. 1− pd(τ s, ǫ) ≤ pm, (8a)
T ≥ τ s ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ ǫ ≥ ǫ, (8b)
where (8a) sets the constraint on the probability of miss detection allowed by the PT.
Meanwhile, after accounting for the payment made to the SG for interference (cf., (8)), the
individual goal of ST k now becomes maximizing the net payoff for its transmission. From
(8a), we obtain pd(τ s, ǫ) ≥ 1− pm and thus are able to relax the constraint in (7c) by replacing
9pd(τ s, ǫ) therein with 1− pm. Let ν denote the STs’ valuation per unit transmission rate. Then,
based on the local optimization problem of ST k defined in (7), we formulate the following
expected payoff optimization problem for the STs:
ST k’s payoff optimization problem is to find a strategy vector s∗k=(τ
h,∗
k , τ
t,∗
k , τ
b,∗
k ) such that
s∗k = arg max
sk=(τ
h
k
,τ t
k
,τb
k
)
(
θk(sk; s0) = ν
(
τ bkr
b
k(τ
s, ǫ) + τ tkr
t
k(τ
h
k , τ
t
k; τ
s, ǫ)
)− αp1(1− pd(τ s, ǫ))τ tk),
(9)
s.t.
K∑
i=1
τ bi ≤ (T − τ s),
K∑
i=1
τ ti ≤ (T − τ s), (9a)
τ bk + τ
h
k ≤ (T − τ s), τhk ≥ 0, τ tk ≥ 0, τ bk ≥ 0, (9b)
p1(1− pm)δhPTk PPTτhk − P cτ tk ≥ 0. (9c)
The time scheduling problem described by (8) and (9) can be naturally interpreted as a two-
level decision making process. In the first level, the SG declares its selected values of the
interference price, the sensing duration and the detection threshold. Then, following the SG’s
strategy, the STs negotiate among themselves about the allocation of the harvesting/backscattering
and transmission sub-time slots. With such an allocation scheme, the problem of distributed time
resource allocation can be formulated as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Game). The two-level time scheduling game G is defined by a 3-tuple:
〈K = {0, 1, . . . , K},S=×Sk∈K, {θk}k∈K〉, where player k=0 is the single leader (i.e., the SG),
whose strategy space is S0={s0 = (α, τ s, ǫ) : ǫ≥ǫ≥ǫ, α≥0, T ≥τ s≥0, 1−pd(τ s, ǫ)≤pm}, and
player k (k=1, . . . , K) is one follower player (i.e., an ST), whose strategy space is Sk={sk=
(τhk , τ
t
k, τ
b
k) : τ
h
k ≥ 0, τ tk ≥ 0, τ bk ≥ 0, τhk +τ bk ≤ (T−τ s), p1(1−pm)δhPTk PPTτhk −P cτ tk ≥ 0}∩{sk =
(τhk , τ
t
k, τ
b
k) :
∑K
j=1 τ
t
j+τ
s ≤ T,∑Kj=1 τ bj +τ s ≤ T}. Player k’s individual payoff θk is given by
the objective function in (8) and (9) for k=0 and k 6=0, respectively.
Based on Definition 1, we have the multi-follower sub-game among the STs in G as a 3-tuple:
Gf = 〈KST={1, . . . , K},SST=×Sk, {θk}Kk=1〉. Then, we can define the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
of Gf in the form of simultaneous best response as follows:
Definition 2 (Follower Sub-game NE). Given the SG’s strategy s0, the parametric joint follower
strategy sST,∗(s0) is an NE of Gf if ∀k∈KST, the following condition holds ∀sk∈Sk
(
sST,∗−k (s0)
)
:
θk
(
s∗k(s0), s
ST,∗
−k (s0)
)
≥ θk
(
sk, s
ST,∗
−k (s0)
)
. (10)
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Based on the follower sub-game NE given in Definition 2, we can further define the SE of
game G as the following sub-game perfect NE:
Definition 3 (SE). s∗ = (s∗k)
K
k=0 is the SE of game G if the following inequality is satisfied:
θ0
(
s∗0, s
ST,∗(s∗0)
) ≥ θ0 (s0, sST,∗(s0)) , (11)
where ∀s0 ∈ S0, sST,∗(s0) is one of the rational reactions of the followers satisfying (10).
From Definition 2, we note that for any player k 6=0 in the follower sub-game Gf , its strategy
space Sk depends on the joint adversaries’ strategy, sST−k = (si)i∈KST,i 6=k. Namely, sk ∈ Sk(s−k)
is a set-valued map which depends on the shared, rival-strategy dependent constraints given in
(9a). Therefore, the problem of NE seeking for game Gf becomes a Generalized NE (GNE)
problem [22]. Furthermore, to obtain the joint SE strategy s∗, the followers’ rational reaction
mapping, sf,∗(s0), is required to be established for the follower sub-game given any leader
strategy s0. Then, the problem of SE seeking in G becomes a bilevel programming problem
with multiple lower-level local optimization problems and a single upper-level optimization
problem [23]. Thereby, we analyze the properties of the SE in game G through backward
induction by first investigating the properties of the NE in the follower sub-game Gf .
B. Analysis of the Follower Sub-game
Assume that the leader’s strategy is fixed as s0=(α, τ
s, ǫ). For conciseness, from now on we
omit s0 in ST k’s strategy space Sk(sST−k, s0) and payoff function θk(sk, sST−k, s0) in the analysis
of the follower sub-game. Then, we have the following properties in regard to Gf :
Theorem 1. The following properties hold with respect to the objective and constraint functions
in ST k’s payoff optimization problem defined by (9):
P1: Sk is convex and compact ∀k ∈ KST, and for any feasible sST−k, Sk(sST−k) is nonempty.
P2: ∀k∈KST, the objective function θk(sk, sST−k) given by (9) is a twice continuously differentiable
(C2) concave function with respect to sk.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 indicates that for each ST, the local optimization problem in (9) is a concave
programming problem. Theorem 1 paves the way of resorting to the mathematical tool of Quasi-
Variational Inequalities (QVI) [22] for showing the existence of the GNE in the follower sub-
game. Before proceeding, we first provide the definition of the QVI problem as follows:
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Definition 4 (VI [24]). Given a closed and convex set S ∈ Rn and a gradient-based mapping
F : S → Rn, the VI problem denoted as VI(S, F ), consists of finding a vector s∗ ∈ S, called a
solution of the VI, such that:
(y − s∗)TF (s∗) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ S. (12)
If the defining set S depends on the variable s, i.e., s ∈ S(s), then, VI(S, F ) is a QVI problem.
From Definition 1, we define F f =(−∇skθk(sST))Kk=1 and obtain a corresponding QVI problem
VI(SST, F f), where SST is given by the definition of the follower sub-game Gf . Then, we have
the following property that guarantees the equivalence between the solution to the reformulated
QVI problem VI(SST, F f) and the GNE of the original follower sub-game Gf :
Lemma 1. A joint follower strategy sST,∗ is a GNE of the follower sub-game Gf if and only if
it is a solution of the QVI problem VI(SST, F f).
Proof. With P1 and P2 in Theorem 1, Lemma 1 immediately follows Theorem 3.3 in [22].
By Lemma 1, to show the existence of the NE of sub-game Gf , it suffices to show that the
solution set to the QVI problem VI(SST, F f) is non-empty. Through inspecting the convexity
and compactness of the strategy set and the monotonicity property of F f , we obtain Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For any feasible s0, the follower sub-game Gf admits at least one GNE. Further-
more, let the GNE be denoted by sST,∗=[s∗1, . . . , s
∗
K ]
⊤, then for ST k∈KST, τh,∗k =T−τ s−τ b,∗k .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 shows that the STs tend to fully utilize the time fraction for channel state Busy to
backscatter or harvest energy. Then, we can remove one of the inter-dependent strategy variables
τhk and τ
b
k and obtain sk = (τ
h
k =T−τ s−τ bk , τ tk, τ bk) without affecting the sub-game NE as the
joint solution to (9). Since for each ST, the local optimization problem in (9) is a concave
programming problem, we can derive the GNE of the follower sub-game through solving the
concatenated Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the local problems ∀k∈KST. Let G(sST)
denote the vector of constraints that are jointly determined by sST, and Zk(sk) denote the vector
12
of constraints that depend only on the local strategy sk. Then, from (9) we have
G(sST) =

G1(sST)
G2(sST)

 =


K∑
k=1
τ tk − (T − τ s)
K∑
k=1
τ bk − (T − τ s)

 , (13)
and
Zk(sk) =


Z1k(sk)
Z2k(sk)
Z3k(sk)


⊤
=


−τ tk
−τ bk
P cτ tk − p1(1− pm)δhPTk PPT(T − τ s − τ bk)


⊤
. (14)
Let λk and µk denote the KKT multiplier vector for G and Zk in the local optimization problem
of ST k, respectively. Then, for ST k the KKT conditions are as follows:
∇skθk(sk)−
(∇skG(sST))⊤λk − (∇skZk(sk))⊤µk = 0, (15)
0 ≤ λk ⊥ −G(sST) ≥ 0, (16)
0 ≤ µk ⊥ −Zk(sk) ≥ 0, (17)
where (16) and (17) provide the complementary conditions and the operator ⊥ represents
component-wise orthogonality. Namely, for two vectors x and y, x ⊥ y ⇔ xiyi=0, ∀i. Observ-
ing G(sST) and Zk(sk), we note that all the constraint functions are affine. Thereby, we can imme-
diately find a feasible strategy s˜k =
(
τ tk =
(T−τs)
2K
, τ bk = min
(
(T−τs)
2K
, T − τ s − P cτ tk
p1(1−pm)δhPTk PPT
))
that guarantees ∀k ≥ 1, Gi ≤ 0 and Zjk ≤ 0 for all the constraint indices i and j at s˜k. Then,
according to the Slater’s theorem (cf. Chapter 5.2.3 of [25]), s˜k is in the relative interior of
the strategy domain and satisfies the Slater’s condition. Therefore, strong duality holds for the
Lagrangian of the local optimization problem in (9) and the KKT conditions given by (15)-(17)
provide both the necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal solution to (9). Then, we have
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. If
(
sST,∗, (λ∗k)
K
k=1, (µ
∗
k)
K
k=1
)
solves the concatenated KKT system given by (15)-(17),
then sST,∗ is a GNE point of the follower sub-game Gf .
Proof. With P1 and P2 in Theorem 1 and the strong duality of the Lagrangian function corre-
sponding to (15) shown above, Lemma 2 immediately follows Theorem 4.6 of [22].
Lemma 2 naturally leads to the idea of deriving the follower sub-game equilibria through
identifying the solution of the concatenated local KKT systems given by (15)-(17) for all k ∈ KST.
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Further inspection into the structure of Gf reveals that a simplified form of the solution to the
concatenated KKT system can be obtained. This relies on showing that the follower sub-game
Gf is an exact potential game [26]:
Lemma 3. The follower game Gf is an exact potential game with the following potential function
φ(sST) =
K∑
k=1
θk(sk, s
ST
−k). (18)
Proof. From (9) we note that θk(s
ST) only depends on the local strategy sk. Then, from (18),
∀sk, s′k ∈ SSTk (sST−k) the following holds with any given sST−k ∈ SST−k:
φ(sk, s
ST
−k)−φ(s′k, sST−k)=
(
θk(sk)+
∑
j 6=k θj(sj)
)
−
(
θk(s
′
k)+
∑
j 6=k θj(sj)
)
=θk(sk)− θk(s′k).
By the definition of the potential game [26], Gf is an exact potential game.
Based on Lemma 3, we are able to convert the multi-player, non-cooperative sub-game Gf
into a single optimization problem and obtain Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The solution to the concatenated local KKT systems given by (15)-(17), (s∗k,λ
∗
k,µ
∗
k),
∀k∈KST, is also the socially optimal NE in Gf . Furthermore, λ∗k=λ∗, ∀k∈KST.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemmas 2-4 make it possible to introduce the Lagrangian-based analysis of the NE in Gf .
Based on Lemma 4, we can further verify the uniqueness of the NE in Gf and obtain Theorem 3:
Theorem 3. The follower sub-game Gf admits a unique NE. Namely, the concatenated KKT
system given by (15)-(17) has a unique solution in the form of (sST,∗,λ∗,µ∗1, . . . ,µ
∗
K).
Proof. See Appendix C.
C. Analysis of Stackelberg Equilibria in Game G
By Theorem 3, Gf admits a unique GNE given any s0. Let E(s0) denote such a GNE mapping
from s0 and gph E(s0)={(s0, sST) : sST=E(s0)} denote the graph of E(s0). Then, by Definition 1,
the feasible region of the SE in G is Ω(s0, sST)=S0 ∩ gph E(s0). After including the potential
function-based KKT system given by (38)-(40) into the leader’s optimization problem in (8), the
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SE in game G is equivalent to the global solution of the following Mathematical Programming
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) problem [23]:
s∗0 = arg max
s0=(α,τs,ǫ)
(
θ0(s0, s
ST) = αp1
K∑
k=1
(1− pd(τ s, ǫ))τ tk.
)
(19)
s.t. 1− pd(τ s, ǫ) ≤ pm, (19a)
T ≥ τ s ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ ǫ ≥ ǫ, (19b)
sST = E(s0), (19c)
where (19a)-(19b) defines S0, and E(s0) in (19c) is the parametric solution to the KKT system
given by (38)-(40). Since the objective function in (19) is continuous in s0 and coercive in α,
namely, θ0(s0, s
ST)→∞ if α→∞, by the well-known Weierstrass Theorem [27], at least one
global optimal solution in (19) exists if Ω(s0, s
ST) is non-empty and closed, and the objective
function θ0(s0, s
ST(s0)) is continuous in s0. Therefore, we are able to develop the following
theorem (cf. Theorems 5.1 in [23]) regarding the SE in game G.
Theorem 4. Game G admits at least one global SE as defined by (11).
Proof. See Appendix D.
By replacing the implicit function sST= E(s0) in (19c) with the KKT system given in (38)-
(40), (19) reduces the bilevel programming problem for SE searching into a single-level problem.
However, we note from (9) that θk(sk, s0) is a transcendental function of τ
t
k. Then, a closed-form
solution to the KKT system in (38)-(40) does not exists. Moreover, due to the complementary
conditions in (39) and (40), standard qualification conditions are violated everywhere in (19)
(see also Theorem 5.11 in [23]). Therefore, (19) is a non-convex problem to which the classical
KKT-based analysis does not apply. Fortunately, from the proof of Theorem 4, we know that
the followers’ parametric NE sST=E(s0) is piecewise continuously differentiable (PC1), hence
directionally differentiable (cf. Corollary 4.1 in [23]). Thereby, instead of relying on heuristic
method for SE searching (cf. [28]), in what follows, we are able to implement a directional
ascent-based method for the SE computation, which allows the follower sub-game NE to be
solved as a nested problem in a distributed manner.
IV. DISTRIBUTED APPROACH FOR COMPUTING STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
A. Directional Ascent Method for SE Searching
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Algorithm 1 Directional ascent method for SE searching
Initialization: Select a feasible s0(t = 0), choose updating coefficient ρ ∈ (0, 1).
1: while the condition ‖s0(t+1)−s0(t)‖ ≤ χ0 is not satisfied for a given precision χ0>0 do
2: Compute a direction vector r(t), ‖r(t)‖≤1 such that, ∃d(t) < 0, d(t) ∈ R
θ′0(s0(t), E(s0(t)); r(t)) ≥ −d(t), ∇s0Z0(s0(t)) ≤ −Z0(s0(t)) + d(t),
where θ′0(s0(t), E(s0(t)); r(t)) is the directional derivative with respect to r(t). For vector r at strategy s0,
we have
θ′0(s0, E(s0); r)=∇s0θ0(s0, E(s0))r +∇sSTθ0(s0, E(s0))E ′(s0; r). (20)
3: Choose a step size β(t) such that s0(t+ 1) = s0(t) + β(t)r(t) and
θ0(s0(t+ 1), E(s0(t+ 1)) ≥ θ0(s0(t), E(s0(t)))− ρβ(t)d(t), Z0(s0(t+ 1)) ≤ 0.
4: Set t← t+ 1 and compute sST(t) = E(s0(t)).
5: end while
Now, with the directional differentiability of the implicit function sST = E(s0), we apply
the directional ascent algorithm (i.e. the prototypical algorithm proposed in [29]) to solve the
MPEC problem defined by (19). Let Z0(s0)= 1 − pd(τ s, ǫ)−pm denote the constraint function
given in (8a). Then, the directional ascent algorithm can be described in Algorithm 1. Here,
we note that prototypical method given by Algorithm 1 in itself does not designate a way of
either finding the direction vector r(t) or finding the sub-game NE E(s0(t)) at s0(t). For the
convenience of discussion, we temporarily assume that the value of E(s0) and its corresponding
set of Lagrange multipliers (λ,µ) in the solution to (38)-(40) are accessible for every s0. Let
G˜(sST) be the vector of all the lower-level constraints given by (9a)-(9c), which is formed through
concatenating G(sST) in (13) and Zk(sk), ∀k∈KST in (14). Let I0(s0, sST)={i : G˜i(s0, sST)=0}
be the set of active lower-level constraints (see also Definition 6). Then, according to Theorem
3.4 in [29] (cf. Theorem 5.4 in [23]), finding the directional vector r(t), the intermediate scalar
parameter d(t) and the directional derivative of θ′0(s0, E(s0); r(t)) in Algorithm 1 is equivalent
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to solving the following linear programming problem with sST = E(s0) and I0:
(d∗, r∗, ν ∗, ζ ∗i ) = arg min
(d,r,ν ,ζ)
d (21)
s.t. −∇⊤
s
STθ0(s0, s
ST)ν −∇⊤s0θ0(s0, sST)r ≤ d (21a)
∇⊤s0Z0(s0, sST)r ≤ −Z0(s0, sST) + d, (21b)
−∇2(sST)2L(s0, sST,λ,µ)ν −∇2sSTs0L(s0, sST,λ,µ)r+∇sSTG˜(sST)ζ = 0, (21c)
∇⊤
s
STG˜i(s
ST)ν = 0, ∀i ∈ I0, (21d)
∇⊤
s
STG˜j(s
ST)ν ≤ −G˜j(sST) + d, ∀j /∈ I0, (21e)
ζi ≥ 0, i ∈ I0, ζi = 0, i /∈ I0, ‖r‖ ≤ 1. (21f)
For conciseness, we omit the iteration index t in (21). In (21c), L(s0, s
ST,λ,µ) is the Lagrangian
function for the lower-level problem as defined in (37), and ζ is a (2+3K)-dimentional vector.
From (13), (14) and (37), we note that ∇2(sST)2G(sST)=0, ∇2sSTs0G(sST)=0, ∇2(sST)2Zk(sST)=0
and ∇2
s
STs0
Zk(s
ST) = 0, ∀k ∈ KST. Then, we obtain ∇2(sST)2L(s0, sST,λ,µ) = ∇2(sST)2φ(s0, sST)
and ∇2
s
STs0
L(s0, s
ST,λ,µ)=∇2
s
STs0
φ(s0, s
ST) in (21c). As a result, the solution to (21) does not
require discovering the Lagrange multipliers (λ,µ) for a pair of strategies (s0, s
ST) in advance.
Therefore, the problem given in (21) can be effectively solved as long as the lower-level payoffs
are available to the SG for strategy pair (s0, s
ST).
Following the proof of Theorem 3, we know that ∇skG˜i(sST) is constant. Also, given (s0, sST),
as long as ∃i, j ∈KST such that Z1i (sST) 6=0, Z2j (sST) 6=0 and Z3i (sST) 6=0, the gradients in the
set {∇
s
STG˜i(s
ST) : i ∈ I0(s0, sST)} are linearly independent. When a feasible solution to (21),
(d∗, r∗, ν ∗, ζ ∗i ), is found with d
∗ < 0, by Theorem 3.4 in [29], ν ∗ will be the directional derivative
of the implicit function E ′(s0; r). Meanwhile, we can construct the following matrix:
M =

 ∇2(sST)2φ(s0, sST) ∇sSTG˜i∈I0(s0,sST)(sST) ∇2s0sSTφ(s0, sST)
∇
s
STG˜i∈I0(s0,sST)(s
ST) 0 0

 . (22)
It is tedious but easy to check that ∇2s0sSTφ(s0, sST) is of full row rank. Then, following our
discussion on the linear independency of the row vectors in ∇
s
STG˜i∈I0(s0,sST)(s
ST), M is of full
row rank. By Theorem 6.1 in [23], since the conditions of SSOC, CRCQ (see Definitons 5 and 6)
and full row rank of M are satisfied, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to a local optimum
solution to (19). Therefore, the convergence to the local SE is guaranteed for Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 2 Asynchronous proximal-response method for finding sub-game GNE
Initialization: Select an initial strategy sST(t = 0) = (s1(0), . . . , sK(0)) ∈ SST.
1: while the condition ‖sST0 (t+ 1)− sST0 (t)‖ ≤ χST is not satisfied for a given χST > 0 do
2: for all k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: Set the adversary joint strategies as
sST
−k(t) = (s1(t+ 1), . . . , sk−1(t+ 1), sk+1(t), . . . , sK(t)). (23)
4: Given sST
−k
(t), compute a local optimal solution sk(t+ 1):
sk(t+ 1) = argmax
sk
θk(sk, s
ST
−k
(t))− 1
2
‖sk − sk(t)‖2,
s.t. G(sk, s
ST
−k
(t)) ≤ 0, Zk(sk) ≤ 0.
(24)
5: end for
6: Set t← t+ 1.
7: end while
B. Distributed Method for NE Searching in the Follower Sub-game
Algorithm 1 relies on the computation of the lower-level rational reactions sST=E(s0) at s0 to
determine the ascent direction. For the purpose of distributively finding the GNE of the follower
sub-game Gf , we introduce the regularized best-response algorithm (also known as proximal-
response map) from [22] in Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 is a Gauss-Seidel-style algorithm based
on a regularized objective function of the sub-problem in (9) for iterative GNE searching. The
convergence property of Algorithm 2 is proved in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (Convergence). Algorithm 2 converges to a GNE from any feasible sST(t = 0).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we employ the potential-game property
of Gf and prove by contradiction that if Algorithm 2 converges, it converges to a GNE of Gf .
In the second part, we exploit the monotonicity of VI(SST, F ) and show that Algorithm 2 is a
contractive mapping and therefore always converges. See Appendix E for the details.
In Corollary 1, we can further show that the proximal response also converges when the STs
adopt a synchronous local strategy updating scheme.
Corollary 1. The synchronous updating mechanism given by Algorithm 3 (i.e., Jacobian best-
response updating) converges to a GNE from any initial strategies sST(t = 0).
Proof. See Appendix E.
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Algorithm 3 Simultaneous best-response updating for finding GNE
Initialization: Select an initial strategy sST(t = 0) = (s1(0), . . . , sK(0)) ∈ SST.
1: while the termination criterion is not satisfied do
2: for all k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: Given sST(t), compute a local optimal solution s′
k
according to (24).
4: end for
5: t← t+ 1, sk(t+ 1) = s′k.
6: end while
Remark. The convergence of Algorithms 2 and 3 relies on the special structure of the utility
function θk(sk, s
ST
−k), ∀k ∈ KST. Namely, θk depends only on sk thus ∇sSTF (sST) is a block
diagonal matrix (see Appendix B). For a general case, it requires that F (sST) in (35) is a
P(P0)-property mapping [30]. Otherwise, the convergence conditions of Algorithms 2 and 3 are
typically not known, and Algorithms 2 and 3 can be considered at most good heuristic [22].
It is well known that a generic bilevel programming problem is strongly NP-hard, even
when checking the local optimality of a strategy with both levels’ objective functions being
quadratic [28]. As a result, it is difficult to precisely determine the computational complexity of
the proposed SE searching scheme described by Algorithms 1-3. Fortunately, we note that the
upper-level directional ascent algorithm described by Algorithm 1 is executed at the SG. Since
the SG possesses sufficient computational power for performing the directional vector search in
(21) as well as the iterative gradient ascent, we only need to focus on the complexity of the
distributed NE searching schemes for the follower subgame. For conciseness, we analyze the
time complexity of Algorithm 3, from which the similar result can be derived for Algorithm 2.
Following (57) in Appendix E-2, let s(·) denote the joint best response obtained from solving
(24). Then, for any two feasible joint strategies of the STs, y and z, there exists a constant
c∈(0, 1) such that
‖s(y)−s(z)‖≤c ‖y− z‖ , (25)
where
∥∥∥∥∥Diag
(∥∥∥−∇2s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
∥∥∥−1)K
k=1
∥∥∥∥∥≤ c < 1, and according to the discussion about (54),
we have ∀k∈K, ∃ηk∈(0, 1) such that x˜k = ηksk(z) + (1− ηk)sk(y).
With an initial strategy sST(0), we set the termination criterion in Algorithm 3 as ‖s(sST(t))−
sST,∗‖/‖sST(0) − sST,∗‖ ≤ χST, where χST > 0 is the relative accuracy and sST,∗ represents the
follower subgame NE. Given a proper estimation of c and an accuracy level χST for algorithm
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TABLE I
MAIN PARAMETERS USED IN THE SIMULATION
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
p0 0.6 W 1MHz T 1s AWGN power −40dBm δ 0.6 ν 1
p1 0.4 γ 3dB PPT 10W ξ2 0.01 κk 0.6 P
c -35dBm
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Fig. 2. (a) Expected average throughput of the STs with respect to the varied sensing time and detection threshold when the
interference price is fixed as α=108. (b) Expected average payoff of the STs vs. the varied interference price with different
sensing strategies. (c) Expected revenue of the SG vs. the varied interference price with different sensing strategies.
termination, we can iteratively apply (25) to the solution of (24) in Algorithm 3. Then, we obtain
the lower bound on the number of iterations t in order for Algorithm 3 to converge as follows:
t ≥ ln(1/χ
ST)
| ln c| . (26)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For the ease of exposition, we assume that the backscattering rates for the STs are the same,
and the STs are randomly placed near the SG within a distance ofD≤30m. We adopt a lognormal
shadowing path loss model for the channel gains as hk = D
−l
k , where l is the path loss factor,
l = 3.5. We employ the Monte Carlo simulations to approximate the node performance of the
nodes, and the major parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table I. In our simulations,
we first consider a secondary network with 5 STs. Since the ST’s throughput and payoff are a
function of the SG’s strategy s0 = (α, τ
s, ǫ), in Figure 2, we provide the graphical insight into
the impact of the SG’s sensing strategy and pricing strategy on the performance of the STs,
respectively. From Figure 2(a), we observe that the STs’ performance is more sensitive to the
detection threshold ǫ, since a small ǫ will result in the probability of false alarm pf sharply rising
to 1, while a large ǫ will result in the probability of detection pd quickly falling to 0. On the
other hand, as we expect, Figure 2(b) shows that by adjusting the interference price, the SG can
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison for the proposed method, the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme and the backscatter-only
scheme. (a) Expected average payoff of the STs at the SE vs. the number of the STs. (b) Expected average throughput of the
STs at the SE vs. the number of the STs. (c) Expected interference price set by the SG at the SE vs. the number of the STs.
(d) Expected payoff of the SG at the SE vs. the number of the STs.
efficiently control the STs’ usage of the idle time fraction in a time slot for direct transmission.
An extremely high price will drive all the STs to completely evacuate from using the idle state
for their transmission and operate only in the backscattering mode. Furthermore, by comparing
Figures 2(b) and 2(c), we note that the maximum revenue of the SG will be reached at the loss
of the ST’s payoff, but before any ST refuses using any of the idle sub-time slot.
In Figure 3, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with the performance
of harvest-then-transmit-only and backscatter-only schemes in difference network scales. From
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we observe that the difference between the average payoff/throughput
achieved by the proposed method and the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme is larger than the
average throughput achieved by the backscatter-only scheme. This indicates that by adopting
the hybrid transmit scheme, the STs have more advantage in negotiating the price with the
SGs than with the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme. This phenomenon can also be observed in
Figure 3(c), since the equilibrium price asked by the SG in the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme
is always slightly higher than that with the proposed method, although the performance of the
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison between the proposed scheme and two reference schemes. (a) Expected average payoff of the
STs at the SE vs. different p1. (b) Expected average throughput of the STs at the SE vs. different p1. (c) Expected interference
price at the SE vs. different p1. (d) Expected payoff of the SG at the SE vs. different p1.
former is significantly lower than that of the latter. This indicates that by adopting the hybrid
transmission scheme, the STs’ performance gain is larger than the sum of the performance of both
the harvest-then-transmit-only and backscatter-only schemes. Theoretically, with the proposed
scheme, the STs are able to switch to the backscattering mode whenever the interference price
exceeds the critical level. For the STs, in this situation operating in harvest-then-transmit mode
will incur more payment due to interference. Therefore, completely staying in the backscattering
mode will provide a better payoff. As a result, if the interference price is too high, the STs
are always able to “threaten” to completely abstain from active transmission such that the SG
receives zero payment. In return, this will discourage the SG from continuously increasing the
interference price. By contrast, with the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme, the STs have no
choice but continue their transmission when the interference price keeps rising, until some of
the STs are forced out of play (i.e., stop transmitting) due to negative payoffs.
In Figure 4, we investigate the impact of the probability of the busy state on the performance
of the proposed transmission scheme. For the simulation, the number of the STs is fixed at
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5. We note from Figures 4(a) and 4(b) that the performance of the backscatter-only scheme
improves as the probability of the channel staying busy increases, while the performance of
the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme becomes worse at the same time. We can further observe
from Figure 4(b) that as the chance of direct transmission reduces with the increasing probability
of the channel staying busy, with the proposed hybrid transmission policy, the STs are able to
achieve a significantly higher throughput than that of using either of the two fixed-scheme trans-
mission policies. Especially, the proposed hybrid scheme suffers from less severe performance
deterioration than that of the harvest-then-transmit scheme. Again, as can be interpreted from
Figures 4(c) and 4(d), by adopting the proposed transmission scheme, the STs have an advantage
in interference price negotiation with the SG over the harvest-then-transmit-only scheme. When
the chance of transmission becomes smaller as the channel becomes busier, such an advantage
will lead to a significant performance improvement at the SE.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the sensing-pricing-transmitting strategy adaptation problem in
the RF-powered backscatter cognitive radio network. In the considered network, the secondary
transmitters operate in a non-cooperative manner to compete for the time resource for their own
transmission. The secondary gateway considers the condition of imperfect channel detection and
employs a pricing mechanism to manage the interference from the secondary network to the
primary users. Mathematically, we have modeled the strategy adaptation process between the
secondary gateway and the secondary transmitters as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg
game, where the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is further modeled as a
generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our discoveries on the
uniqueness of the generalized Nash equilibrium in the follower sub-game and the continuity of
the leader’s strategy-payoff mapping, we have proposed a directional ascent-based algorithm for
the leader’s strategy searching, where a distributed Nash equilibrium searching algorithm for
the lower-level sub-game is nested therein. Both of the theoretical and numerical analysis have
shown the convergence and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The property in P1 of Theorem 1 is straightforward from the formulation of (9). To prove P2,
we analyze the Hessian matrix Hk = ∇2s2
k
θk(s
ST) for each player k given a feasible adversaries’
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strategy sST−k. Note that the value of θk(s
ST) is determined only by sk, then, we have
Hk =


∂2θk
∂(τhk )
2
∂2θk
∂τhk ∂τ
t
k
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k
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∂2θk
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k
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2


. (27)
We note that Hk is symmetric. Given a fixed pair of (τ
s, ǫ), let us define
 A
1
k = νp0(1− pf (τ s, ǫ))κkW,
A2k = νp1(1− pd(τ s, ǫ))κkW,
(28)
and 
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γ1k =
p1p
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σ2k
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Then, we have
∂2θk
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For any arbitrary real-valued non-zero vector vk = [v
1
k, v
2
k, v
3
k]
⊤, after substituting (30)-(33) into
(27), we obtain
v⊤k Hkvk=−
(
A1k(γ
1
k)
2(γ2kτ
h
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(34)
Therefore, Hk is negative semidefinite and θk(s
ST) is a concave function in sk.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Definition 1, we note that SST is a closed convex polytope and is therefore continuous.
By P2 in Theorem 1, θk(sk, s
ST
−k) is a C
2 concave function in sk. We also note from (9)
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that θk(sk, s
ST
−k) depends only on sk. Therefore, we can construct the Jacobian of F
f(sST),
∇
s
STF f(sST)=−
[
∇2sk,s′kθk(s)
]K
k,k′=1
and obtain the following block diagonal matrix:
−∇
s
STF f(sST)=
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
∇2
s2
1
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ST) ∇2s1,s2θ1(sST) · · · ∇2s1,sKθ1(sST)
∇2s2,s1θ2(sST) ∇2s2
2
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ST) · · · ∇2s2,sKθ2(sST)
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. . .
...
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H1 0 · · · 0
0 H2 · · · 0
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. . .
...
0 0 · · · HK

 ,
(35)
where Hk is given by (27) in Appendix A. With the same technique used in Appendix A, we
can immediately verify that ∇
s
STF f(sST) is positive semidefinite on SST. Therefore, F f(sST) is a
continuous monotone mapping on SST. Then, according to (8) and (13) in [24] (cf. Theorem 4.1
in [22]), the set of solutions to VI(SST, F f) is nonempty, closed and convex. By Lemma 1, such
a set of solution is at the same time the set of GNE for game Gf . Then, a nonempty, closed and
convex set of GNE exists in the follower sub-game Gf .
Furthermore, we note from (6) that rtk(sk, s0) in the objective function of (9) is a monotonic
increasing function of τhk . Then, we can show by contradiction that for ST k’s local optimization
problem in (9), the equality in the constraint τ bk+τ
h
k ≤ (T−τ s) is always reached at the sub-
game NE strategy s∗k = (τ
h,∗
k , τ
t,∗
k , τ
b,∗
k ), ∀k ∈ KST. Otherwise, we can find a different strategy
sk = (τ
h
k , τ
t,∗
k , τ
b,∗
k ), where τ
h = (T −τ s)−τ b,∗k > τh,∗k such that θk(sk; s0) > θk(s∗k; s0), which
contradicts with (10) in Definition 2. Thereby, the proof to Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4 AND THEOREM 3
1) Proof of Lemma 4: Following Lemma 3, by the definition of the potential game, we have
∇skφ(sST) = ∇skθk(sST) (cf. [26]). Then, with the extra condition τhk = T −τ s−τ bk given in
Theorem 2, consider the following network payoff maximization problem based on the potential
function given in (18):
sST,∗ = arg max
s
ST=(sk)
K
k=1
(
φ(sST)=
K∑
k=1
(
ν
(
τ bkr
b
k(τ
s, ǫ)+τ tkr
t
k(sk; τ
s, ǫ)
)−αp1 (1− pd(τ s, ǫ)) τ tk)
)
,
s.t.
K∑
i=1
τ bi ≤ (T − τ s),
K∑
i=1
τ ti ≤ (T − τ s),
∀k ∈ KST : τ tk ≥ 0, τ bk ≥ 0,
∀k ∈ KST : p1(1− pm)δhPTk PPT(T − τ s − τ bk)− P cτ tk ≥ 0.
(36)
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By Theorem 2.2 in [26], the set of solutions to (36) coincides with the set of NE in Gf . By
(35), φ(sST) is concave with respect to sST and (36) is a concave programming problem. From
(36), we can obtain the following Lagrangian function:
L(sST,λ,µ1, . . . ,µk) = φ(s
ST)−G(sST)⊤λ −
K∑
k=1
Z(sk)
⊤µk. (37)
Since ∀k∈KST, ∇sj:j 6=kZk(sk)=0, from (37), the KKT condition to (36) can be written as
∀k ∈ KST : ∇skφ(sST)−
(∇skG(sST))⊤ λ − (∇skZ(sk))⊤µk = 0, (38)
0 ≤ λ ⊥ −G(sST) ≥ 0, (39)
∀k ∈ KST : 0 ≤ µk ⊥ −Zk(sk) ≥ 0, (40)
where G(sST) and Zk(sk) are given by (13) and (14), respectively. By Theorem 2.2 in [26],
from the solutions to (38)-(40), i.e.,
(
sST,∗,λ∗,µ∗1, . . . ,µ
∗
k
)
, sST,∗ forms a set of solutions which
is equivalent to the set of NE in Gf . Meanwhile, by Lemma 2, for each sST,∗ there exists a set of
multipliers (λ˜k, µ˜k), ∀k∈KST, that forms a solution to the concatenated KKT conditions given
by (15)-(17). If we set λ˜k =λ
∗ and µ˜k =µ
∗
k, ∀k ∈KST, by comparing (38)-(40) and (15)-(17),
we note that ∇skφ(sST)=∇skθk(sST), then,
(
sST,∗,λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗k = λ∗,µ∗1, . . . ,µ∗k
)
is exactly the
solution to the concatenated KKT system given by (38)-(40). Therefore, Lemma 4 is proved.
2) Proof of Theorem 3: Due to the negative semi-definiteness of −∇
s
STF f(sST), which hap-
pens to be the Hessian matrix of φ(sST), we examine the Strong Sufficient Optimality Condition
(SSOC) of second order for the Lagrangian given by (37) instead. For the specific convex
optimization problem described by (38)-(40), the SSOC is mathematically defined as follows:
Definition 5 (SSOC [23]). The SSOC is said to be satisfied at s = (s0, s
ST), if for each set of
multiplies (λ,µ1, . . . ,µK) that solves (38)-(40) with s
ST, for every non-zero vector d satisfying
 d
⊤∇
s
STGi(s0, s
ST) = 0, if λi > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
d⊤∇
s
STZ ik(s0, s
ST) = 0, if µik > 0, ∀k ∈ KST, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
(41)
we have d⊤∇2
s
ST,sSTL(s
ST,λ,µ1, . . . ,µk)d < 0, where L(s
ST,λ,µ1, . . . ,µk) is defined in (37).
From the complementary conditions in (39) and (40), we know that the conditions λi > 0
and µik > 0 hold only when G
i = 0 and Z ik = 0, respectively. Noting that ∇sSTGi(s0, sST) and
∇
s
STZ ik(s0, s
ST) are all constant vectors, we have ∇2
s
ST,sSTL(s
ST,λ,µ1, . . . ,µk)=∇2
s
ST,sSTφ(s
ST)=
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−∇
s
STF f(sST). Since (35) defines a block diagonal matrix, by Definition 5 and Lemma 4, it
suffices to verify that ∀k ∈ KST, d˜⊤∇2
s2
k
φ(sST)d˜ < 0, ∀d˜ 6= 0 satisfying the following conditions:
 d˜
⊤∇skGi(s0, sST) = 0, if λi > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
d˜⊤∇skZ ik(s0, sST) = 0, if µik > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
(42)
We note from (13) and (14) that for ST k with strategy sk = (τ
t
k, τ
b
k), ∇skG1(s0, sST) =
[1, 0]⊤, ∇skG2(s0, sST) = [0, 1]⊤, ∇skZ1k(s0, sST) = [−1, 0]⊤, ∇skZ2k(s0, sST) = [0,−1]⊤ and
∇skZ3k(s0, sST)=[P c, p1(1−pm)δhPTk P PT]⊤. By (34), we have d˜⊤∇2s2
k
φ(sST)d˜ = d˜⊤∇2
s2
k
θk(sk)d˜ ≤
0 for any d˜. From (42), we note that to ensure d˜ 6= 0, we are able to enumerate the following
cases of non-zero multiplier combination without the need of knowing the set of (s∗k,λ
∗,µ∗k):
(i) If G1(s0, s
ST) = 0 or Z1(s0, s
ST) = 0, and at the same time G2(s0, s
ST) < 0, Z2(s0, s
ST) < 0
and Z3(s0, s
ST) < 0, we have d˜∈{d=[d1, 0]⊤ :d1∈R, d1 6=0}.
(ii) if G2(s0, s
ST) = 0 or Z2(s0, s
ST) = 0, and at the same time G1(s0, s
ST) < 0, Z1(s0, s
ST) < 0
and Z3(s0, s
ST) < 0, we have d˜∈{d=[0, d1]⊤ :d1∈R, d1 6=0}.
(iii) If Z3(s0, s
ST) = 0, and at the same time G1(s0, s
ST) < 0, G2(s0, s
ST) < 0, Z1(s0, s
ST) < 0
and Z2(s0, s
ST) < 0, we have d˜∈{d=[d1,− P cp1(1−p˜m)δhPTk P PTd1]
⊤ :d1∈R, d1 6=0}.
From (34), we can derive the condition of d˜⊤∇2
s2
k
θk(sk)d˜ = 0 for ST k in cases (i), (ii) and (iii)
as τ tk = 0, τ
b
k = T − τ s and τ bk − p1(1−p˜
m)δhPT
k
P PT
P c
τ tk = T − τ s, respectively. Obviously, the equality
condition for case (i) is satisfied only in the extreme scenario of τ tk = 0, ∀k ∈ K, i.e., when no
ST transmits at all. The equality conditions for cases (ii) and (iii) cannot be satisfied for every
k ∈ KST at the same time. Therefore, the SSOC is satisfied by the convex optimization problem
described in (38)-(40). This indicates that the optimal solution to (38)-(40) is strongly stable
(cf. Theorem 4.4 in [23]), and the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed. Then, Theorem 3
immediately follows Lemma 4.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
It is straightforward that θ0(s0, s
ST) in (19) is continuous in s0 and s
ST, respectively, and coer-
cive in the interference price α. Meanwhile, S0 defined by (19a)-(19b) is closed and continuous.
Then, by the Weierstrass Theorem [27], it is sufficient to prove that (a) Ω(s0, s
ST) = S0∩gph E(s0)
is non-empty and closed, and (b) with the implicit function sST = E(s0), θ0(s0, E(s0)) is con-
tinuous in s0. Since the Slater’s condition is satisfied for the constraints given by G(s
ST)
and Zk(sk), ∀k ∈ KST, by Proposition 3.2.7 in [30], the Mangasarian-Fromovitz Constraint
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Qualification (MFCQ) (see [23], [30] for the definition) is satisfied at all feasible points (s0, s
ST)
for the potential function-based lower-level optimization problem in (36). Moreover, according
to Appendix C, the SSOC is also satisfied by the problem in (36). Therefore, by Theorem 4.10
in [23], it is sufficient to prove that the following Constant Rank Constraint Qualification (CRCQ)
is satisfied at any feasible point θ0(s0, s
ST).
Definition 6 (CRCQ [23]). The CRCQ is satisfied for problem (36) at a point (s0, s
ST), if there
exists an open neighborhood Nρ(s0, sST)={(x, y) : ‖(x, y)− (s0, sST)‖<ρ} such that, for each
subset of the active constraints defined as follows:
I ⊆ I0(s0, sST) =
{
i∈{1, 2}, k∈KST, kj∈{1, 2, 3} : Gi(s0, sST) = 0, Zkjk (s0, sST) = 0
}
,
the family of gradient vectors {∇
s
STGi(s0, s
ST),∇
s
STZ
kj
k (s0, s
ST) : (i, k, kj) ∈ I} has the same
rank ∀(x, y) ∈ Nρ(s0, sST).
According to our discussion in Appendix C, ∇
s
STGi(s0, s
ST) and ∇
s
STZjk(s0, s
ST) are all
constant vectors ∀i=1, 2, j=1, 2, 3, k∈KST. Therefore, as long as the subset of active constraints
I is determined for (s0, s
ST), the family of gradient vectors {∇
s
STGi(s0, s
ST),∇
s
STZ
kj
k (s0, s
ST) :
(i, k, kj) ∈ I} are identical for all ∀(x, y) ∈ Nρ(s0, sST). Therefore, the CRCQ is satisfied
everywhere in the problem given by (36). By Theorem 4.10 in [23], sST = E(s0) is a piece-
wise continuously differentiable (PC1) function and θ0(s0, E(s0)) is therefore continuous in s0.
Furthermore, with the closed set S0, by the well-known Closed Graph Theorem, E(s0) being
continuous implies that gph E(s0) is closed. Therefore, Ω(s0, sST) is non-empty and closed, and
the optimization problem in (19) admits a globally optimal solution, namely an SE.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5 AND COROLLARY 1
1) Proof of Theorem 5: We first prove that if a sequence {sST(t)}∞t=0 generated by Algorithm 2
converges, then, that sequence converges to a GNE of Gf . By Lemma 3 and from (24), ∀t, k,
φ(sk(t + 1), s
ST
−k(t))− φ(sk(t), sST−k(t))
= θk(sk(t + 1), s
ST
−k(t))− θk(sk(t), sST−k(t)) ≥
1
2
‖sk(t + 1)− sk(t)‖2 ≥ 0.
(43)
By P1 in Theorem 1, given k ∈ KST, ∀sST−k(t), we can always obtain a solution sk(t + 1) to
(24). From (23), we have sST−(k+1)(t) = (s1(t+1), . . . , sk(t+1), sk+2(t), . . . , sK(t)), therefore,
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(sk+1(t), s
ST
−(k+1)(t))=(sk(t+1), s
ST
−k(t)). Let s
ST
k (t) denote the joint strategy updated in the inner
iteration of Algorithm 2, sSTk (t)=(s1(t+1), . . . , sk(t+1), sk+1(t), . . . , sK(t)). By (43) we have
φ(sST(t+1)) = φ(sSTK (t)) ≥ φ(sSTK−1(t)) ≥ · · · ≥ φ(sSTk (t)) ≥ · · · ≥ φ(sST0 (t)) = φ(sST(t)). (44)
Assume that {sST(t)}∞t=0 is an infinite joint strategy sequence generated by Algorithm 2 such
that ∃sST, lim
t→∞
sST(t)=sST. Then, by the continuity of the potential function φ(sST), we know that
the corresponding sequence {φ(sST(t))}∞t=0 also converges, namely, lim
t→∞
φ(sST(t))=φ. Therefore,
for the sequence {sSTk (t)} generated by Algorithm 2, based on (44) we have
lim
t→∞
φ(sSTk (t)) = φ, ∀k. (45)
Consider the sequence {sk(t)}∞t=0 extracted from {sST(t)}∞t=0, by (43) and (45),
lim
t→∞
(
θk(sk(t+ 1), s
ST
−k(t))− θk(sk(t), sST−k(t))
)
= 0. (46)
Then, together with (43), we deduce that the following holds
lim
t→∞
‖sk(t+ 1)− sk(t)‖ = 0, ∀k, (47)
or equivalently, lim
t→∞
sSTk (t) = s
ST, ∀k.
In order to prove that sST is a GNE, we assume that there exists at least one local strategy
vector for some ST k, xk ∈ S(sST−k), such that θk(xk, sST−k) > θk(sk, sST−k). Then, by the elementary
properties of a concave function, we have
0 < θk(xk, s
ST
−k)− θk(sk, sST−k) ≤ ∇Tskθk(s)(xk − sk). (48)
Let Θk(sk, s
ST
−k, z) = θk(sk, s
ST
−k)− 12‖sk − z‖2. It is straightforward to check the Hessian matrix
of Θk(sk, s
ST
−k, z) based on (35) and show that the regularization term turns Θk(sk, s
ST
−k, z) into
a strongly concave function of sk. Therefore, the uniqueness of the maximum solution to sk
is guaranteed. Then, consider the directional derivative of Θk(sk, s
ST
−k, z) in the direction v =
(xk − sk) at a snapshot of the updating process in Algorithm 2:
Θ′k(sk(t + 1), s
ST
−k(t), sk(t); (xk − sk(t + 1)))
= θ′k(sk(t+ 1), s
ST
−k(t); (xk − sk(t+ 1))) + (sk(t+ 1)− sk(t))⊤(xk − sk(t + 1))
= ∇⊤skθk(sk(t + 1), sST−k(t))(xk − sk(t+ 1)) + (sk(t+ 1)− sk(t))⊤(xk − sk(t+ 1)).
(49)
By (47) and the compactness of Sk (i.e., P1 in Theorem 1), we have lim
t→∞
(sk(t+1)−sk(t))⊤(xk−
sk(t+1)) = 0. According to the optimality condition for concave problems, from (49) we obtain
lim
t→∞
Θ′k(sk(t+ 1), s
ST
−k(t), sk(t); (xk − sk(t + 1))) = ∇⊤skθk(sSTk )(xk − sk) ≤ 0, (50)
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if sk(t+1) is the solution to (24). Since (50) contradicts with (48), by the definition of an NE,
we are ready to conclude that, if the sequence {sST(t)}∞t=0 converges, it converges to a GNE.
Now, it suffices to prove that the iteration given by Algorithm 2 is a contractive mapping [30]
in order to show that Algorithm 2 converges to a GNE. From Θ(sST, z) and (24), we can
construct for each iteration an equivalent QVI problem VI(SST, F˜ f(s; z)) with F˜ f(s; z) =
−(∇skθk(sk(z), z−k) − (sk − zk))Kk=1. In order to construct the contraction map, we consider
two strategy vectors y and z, ∀y 6= z,y, z ∈ SST. Assume that s(y) and s(z) are the unique
solutions to the strongly monotone QVI problems, F˜ f(s;y) and F˜ f(s; z), respectively. Then, by
Definition 4 we have, ∀k,
(xk − sk(y))⊤ (∇skθk(sk(y), y−k)− (sk(y)− yk)) ≤ 0, ∀xk ∈ SSTk (y−k), (51)
(xk − sk(z))⊤ (∇skθk(sk(z), z−k)− (sk(z)− zk)) ≤ 0, ∀xk ∈ SSTk (z−k). (52)
Let xk=sk(z) in (51) and xk=sk(y) in (52). By adding (51) and (52) together we obtain
(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤ (∇skθk(sk(y), y−k)−sk(y)+yk)+(sk(y)−sk(z))⊤ (∇skθk(sk(z), z−k)−sk(z)+zk)
= (sk(z)−sk(y))⊤ (∇skθk(sk(y), y−k)−∇skθk(sk(z), z−k))+(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤(sk(z)−sk(y))
−(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤(zk − yk) ≤ 0.
(53)
By the mean-value theorem, there exists a 0 < ηk < 1 with x˜k = ηksk(z) + (1− ηk)sk(y), such
that ∇skθk(sk(y), y−k)−∇skθk(sk(z), z−k) =
∑
j∈Kf ∇2sksjθk(x˜)(sj(y) − sj(z)). We note from
(35) that for any j 6= k, ∇2sksjθk(x˜) is a zero matrix. Then, from (53) we have
(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤∇2s2
k
θk(x˜)(sk(y)−sk(z))+‖sk(z)−sk(y)‖2−(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤(zk − yk)
= (sk(z)−sk(y))⊤
(
−∇2
s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
)
(sk(z)−sk(y))−(sk(z)−sk(y))⊤(zk − yk)≤0.
(54)
From (54), we obtain∥∥∥−∇2s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
∥∥∥ ‖sk(y)−sk(z)‖ ≤ ‖zk − yk‖ , (55)
By P2 in Theorem 1, −∇2
s2
k
θk(x˜) is positive semidefinite, and all the eigenvalues of −∇2s2
k
θk(x˜)
are non-negative. Furthermore, all the eigenvalues of matrix
(
−∇2
s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
)
are no less than
1. By the elementary property of the eigenvalues and the spectral norm of a symmetric matrix,
we have
∥∥∥−∇2s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
∥∥∥ ≥ 1, where the equality only happens when x˜k,1 = x˜k,2 = 0.
Therefore, the asynchronous proximal-response given by Algorithm 2 is a contractive mapping,
which completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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2) Proof of Corollary 1: The proof of Corollary 1 immediately follows our discussion on
(55). From (55), we can construct the following vector inequality:

‖s1(y)−s1(z)‖
...
‖sK(y)−sK(z)‖

 ≤


∥∥∥−∇2s2
1
θ1(x˜) + I
∥∥∥−1 . . . 0
0
. . . 0
0 . . .
∥∥∥−∇2s2
K
θK(x˜) + I
∥∥∥−1




‖z1 − y1‖
...
‖zK − yK‖

 .(56)
Recall that for the matrix norm if the component-wise inequality A ≥ B ≥ 0 holds for two
non-negative matrices A and B, then ‖A‖ ≥ ‖B‖. Then, from (56) the following holds
‖s(y)−s(z)‖=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥


‖s1(y)−s1(z)‖
...
‖sK(y)−sK(z)‖


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥Diag
(∥∥∥−∇2s2
k
θk(x˜)+I
∥∥∥−1)K
k=1
∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥


‖z1−y1‖
...
‖zK−yK‖


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥Diag
(∥∥∥−∇2s2
k
θk(x˜) + I
∥∥∥−1)K
k=1
∥∥∥∥∥ ‖y− z‖ .
(57)
Since s(y) and s(z) are obtained based on simultaneous best-response updating from the strate-
gies y and z, we know that Algorithm 3 is a contraction of best response and correspondingly
with any initialization it converges to an NE. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
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